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Utah Code
provides:

Ann.

§77-35-29(c)

and

(d)

(1989,

Repl.

Vol.

8C)

(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal
action or proceeding files an affidavit that the judge before
whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a
bias or prejudice, either against the party or his attorney
or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge shall
proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of. Every
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon
as practicable after the case has been assigned or the bias
or prejudice is known.
No affidavit may be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that the
affidavit and the application are made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency
of the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order
directing that a copy be forthwith certified to another named
judge of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
allegations. If the challenged judge does not question the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the case or
to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit
is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally
sufficient, he shall enter a finding to the effect and the
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-11(5) (1989 Repl. Vol. 8C) provides:
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel,
he h^s knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
desir^ counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all
of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
viii

(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement
has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
Code of Judicial Administration,
Professional Conduct provides:

Rule

1.7(b),

Rules

of

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) The
lawyer
reasonably
believes
the
representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation
to each client of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.

IX

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 890145-CA

FRANK DAVID GENTRY,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Frank D. Gentry, plead guilty to Theft, a Third
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as
amended) on January 25, 1989. The Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth
District Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah, denied Mr.
Gentry's motion to withdraw his plea. Mr. Gentry appeals from the
trial courtTs memorandum decision denying his motion to withdraw
his plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Milton H. Gentry and Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry together had
six

children:

Ruby

Jane Gentry

(Roberts),

Mary

Lou

Gentry

(Roberts), Mack N. Gentry, Joseph Gentry, William Larry Gentry
(deceased), and defendant.

(Tr. 47, 61).

Milton H. Gentry owned a ranch located in the vicinity of the
Beaver/Iron County Line in Southern Utah.

The ranch consisted of

7 parcels but was basically separated and referred to as the upper

and lower ranch and a third parcel for a total of approximately
1,840 acres.

Parcel A is situated along 1-15 and consists of

approximately 640 acres.

Parcel B (lower ranch) is located 2 to

3 miles East of 1-15 at Exit 100 and consists of 281 acres.
Parcel C (upper ranch) is located 5 miles East of the lower ranch
and consists of approximately 920 acres.

The upper and lower

sections of the ranch have access to water.
A, B, and C, are known as the Fremont Ranch.1

The three parcels,
(Tr. 17, 34, and

Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts2 attached to Addendum A ) .
In 1949, defendant built a cinderblock cabin on the Fremont
Ranch and later lived there with his wife, Mona Lou, and their
three children.

(R. 56, Tr. 118).

Defendant worked the Fremont Ranch on a daily basis installing
fencing, digging

ditches, cutting

timber, caring

for cattle,

operating a Christmas tree concern, and providing a refuge for
hunters.

(R. 56, Tr. 118).

On September 7, 1962 defendants' father, Milton H. Gentry,
died and was buried on the upper section of the Fremont Ranch.
(Tr. 18, 167). By a holographic will, Milton H. Gentry left the
Fremont Ranch to his wife, Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry, and their six

Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 which appears to be a map of the
property is not contained in the exhibit file. (Tr. 17).
2

Ruby Jane Robert's
Affidavit was filed after the record
was prepared and transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
facts set our in Ms. Roberts1 affidavit and in the attached
exhibits would have been presented to the court to support
defendant's position that the 1981 partition sale was void,
however, the trial court failed to consider this issue.
2

children, Ruby Jane

(Gentry) Roberts, Mack N. Gentry, Joseph

Gentry, William Larry Gentry (now deceased),3 Mary Lou (Gentry)
Roberts, and defendant.

(Tr. 119).

On January 11, 1966, defendant's mother, brothers and sisters
executed

a power of attorney

in favor of defendant

allowing

defendant to promote, operate and manage the Fremont Ranch.

(Tr.

54-55, 120, D-l).
In 1967, Spencer Roberts, Mary Lou (Gentry) Roberts1 husband,
questioned defendant's authority to manage the Fremont Ranch.
Spencer Roberts wanted to run cattle on the newly seeded pasture.
Defendant objected because the cattle would destroy the seed bed.
(Tr. 121-122).

As a consequence of the quarrel, in 1967, attorney

Ken Chamberlain wrote a letter to Ron Bradshaw telling him that
defendant no longer had the power to lease the property to Mr.
Bradshaw.

(Tr. 122).

Although the record in somewhat unclear, defendant's mother,
Ivy

Jane

Erickson

Gentry,

probated her estate.

died

intestate.

Ken

Chamberlain

(Tr. 12, See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry)

Roberts inr 2 and 4 ) .
On November

20, 1974, defendant

appeared

at

the

probate

hearing regarding the estate of Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry to ask
questions

and

to

state

his

objection

3

to

the

administrators

William Larry Gentry and William's wife, Glenda Hawley,
predeceased their two children, leaving their one-sixth interest
in the Freemont Ranch to their surviving children, Larry Gentry
(son) and Andrea Gentry Breinholt (daughter). (Tr. 12).

3

approved by the Court.

After the hearing, on November 20, 1974,

Ken Chamberlain sent a letter to Joseph F. Gentry, Mack

[R.]

Gentry, Mary Lou (Gentry) Roberts, Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, and
Glenda S. Hawley stating that at the probate hearing defendant
claimed he owned 100% interest in the Milton H. Gentry estate and
that Ivy Jane Erickson's entire estate be awarded to him.

Mr.

Chamberlain represented there would be three lawsuits involving
(1) the estate of Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry, (2) the estate of
Milton H. Gentry,

and

(3) a partition

action

to divide

the

property should the judge decide defendant is not entitled to all
of the interests he claims.

(See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry)

Roberts, 1Mf 5 and 6 ) .
Mr. Chamberlain goes on to state in his letter that the heirs
will need adequate representation to counter defendant's claims
to be asserted which will be time consuming and complicated.

Mr.

Chamberlain enclosed with his letter a contingent fee agreement
providing that he take 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch if he prevails or
obtained some recovery.

(See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry)

Roberts, ir 7 and Exh. A ) .
Mr. Chamberlain prepared a written Order setting out the same
representations as contained in Mr. Chamberlain's letter to the
heirs and sent a copy of the Order to the heirs, except defendant.
The Order was signed by the Probate Court.

4

Defendant never filed

a

single4

lawsuit

against

the

heirs,

yet

Mr.

Chamberlain

eventually ended up with approximately 1/3 of the Fremont Ranch
(640 acres).

(See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, If 7

and Exh. B ) .
But for the representations of Ken Chamberlain, some of the
heirs would not have agreed to file the civil lawsuits against
Frank D. Gentry.

(See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts,

« 12).
During July 1989, defendant was staying with his sister, Ruby
Jane

(Gentry)

Roberts.

At

that

time,

she

discovered

the

representations made by Ken Chamberlain, on November 20, 1974,
were

false.

To verify

this

information,

Ruby

Jane

Roberts

obtained a copy of the transcript of the probate hearing held on
November 20, 1974.

(See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts,

V ID.
Defendant never wanted to sell his interest in the property
and was forced out. (Tr. 127). Defendant never said or believed
he owned all of the property and for the others to stay off.

(Tr.

126).
After the partition sale in 1981, defendant refused to take
the $21,833

for about 1-1/2

years until Ken Chamberlain

and

defendant's attorney Gunn McKay finally persuaded defendant to

defendant's first complaint against the co-tenants and
attorney Ken Chamberlain was prepared January 19, 1989 but
subsequently not filed in light of trial counsel? s advice to
defendant to agree, as part of his probation, not to pursue any
civil action. (Tr. 182-183).
5

take it, Mr, McKay retained a portion for attorney's fees and the
balance was used for improvements to the Fremont Ranch.

(Tr. 124,

127, 152).
On or about April 23, 1986, Carlyle Stirling leased part of
the Fremont Ranch for grazing from Frank and Curtis Gentry.
82).

(Tr.

On April 23, 1986 Carlyle Stirling issued a check for

$500.00 payable to defendant (Tr. 83, P-5).
Carlyle Stirling

On June 23, 1986

issued a check in the amount of $100.00 to

defendant (Tr. 85, P-10).

On April 23, 1986, Carlyle Stirling

issued a check for $200.00 to defendant.

(Tr. 85).

On November 10, 1986, Mack and Joseph Gentry, respectively,
sold their 1/5 interest in the Fremont Ranch to Dan and Paul
Roberts (brothers) who are sons to Mary Lou (G€*ntry) Roberts.
(Tr. 20, 41, 72).
On June 9, 1988, Constable Don Murdock certified he served a
copy of a summons and complaint on Frank D. Gentry (R. 5 ) .

No

complaint or information is attached to the summons filed with the
court.
On August 18, 1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry, represented by
Earl F. Spafford, appeared at his preliminary hearing on the
charge of Theft by Deception, a Third Degree Felony.

Scott M.

Burns, Iron County attorney, appeared on behalf of the State of
Utah (R. 22). After witnesses testified, Judge Braithwaite found
probable cause that defendant Frank D. Gentry committed the crime
of Theft.

On August 26, 1988 Judge Robert Braithwaite signed the

6

Bind Over Order requiring defendant Frank D. Gentry to appear at
the Fifth District for arraignment on the crimes of Theft by
Deception and Criminal Trespass (R. 25).
On September 20, 1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry appeared at
his arraignment wherein Judge J. Philip Eves, by interlineation,
amended the Information, dated May 27, 1988 but not filed with the
Fifth District Court until on August 30, 1988, to Theft, a Third
Degree Felony.

Judge Eves did not amend the information to

reflect the correct statute defendant allegedly violated.
28).

(R. 26-

(There is no record that the charging Information was filed

with the Court before August 30, 1988, which is four days after
the preliminary hearing).
On the same day of defendant's arraignment, September 20,
1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry, by and through his counsel,
reviewed and signed an Affidavit of Defendant on Arraignment which
set forth the charge of Theft, a Third Degree Felony, and the
punishment of a prison term of 1 to 15 years and a fine of
$10,000.

The affidavit did not set forth the alleged facts or

elements of the offense but did indicate Mr. Gentry is 62 years
of age and attended school through 12th grade.
Scott

Burns,

Iron

County

attorney,

(R. 31-37).

signed

the

affidavit

certifying that he had not improperly induced or coerced defendant
to plead guilty.

Defense counsel also certified that defendant

understood the meaning of its contents and was mentally and

7

physically competent and all representations therein are accurate
and true.

(R. 31-37).

Jury trial was scheduled for Wednesday, January 4, 1989.
jury

trial

was

rescheduled

to

January

5,

1989

and

The

again

rescheduled for Wednesday, January 25, 1989 as reflected in the
Fifth District Court's Notice dated January 5, 1989.

(R. 45, 46,

50).
On January 25, 1989, the day of the jury trial, Scott M. Burns
filed an Amended

Information alleging Count I Theft, a Third

Degree Felony, against Frank D. Gentry (R. 52). On that same day,
defense counsel, Chase Kimball, filed a trial memorandum with the
Court

(R.

55-63).

Mr.

Kimball's

Trial

Brief

specifically

addressed the charge of Theft by Deception, a Third Degree Felony,
rather than the amended charge of Theft, a Third Degree Felony.
(R. 55).
Even though defendant believed his case would be tried to a
jury, no jury panel was present on January 25, 1989.

(R. 141).

However, Defendant Frank D. Gentry was sworn and questioned as to
whether he waived his right to a jury trial.

(Tr. 4-6).

On April 6, 1989 defendant filed a motion and a supporting
memorandum to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for preliminary
hearing.

In addition, defendant asserted that the underlying

civil action is void and the conditions of probation violated his
rights to pursue a civil remedy and to visit his father's grave.
(R.

117-153).

On

August

24,

8

1989

defendant

submitted

a

supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw his
plea,

(R. 243-253).

The trial court denied defendant's motion

in its memorandum decision dated September 1, 1989 (R. 230-233,
a copy is attached to Addendum B ) .
On August 24, 1989, defendant filed a motion for new trial.
On

August

24,

1989,

prior

to

the

trial

court

issuing

its

memorandum decision, defendant filed a motion to disqualify the
trial judge, supporting memorandum, affidavit of Frank Gentry and
Certificate

of

Counsel.

The

trial

court

did

not

rule

on

defendant's motion for a new trial or to disqualify the trial
judge.

The trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the

1981 civil judgment, which dispossessed defendant of his one-sixth
interest in the Fremont Ranch is void.

The trial court did not

rule on the issues raised regarding defendant's probation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant was denied his right to an unbiased, impartial
judge and a fair proceeding,

a fundamental

principle of due

process, as a consequence of the trial judge's failure to recuse
himself, which also precluded defendant from calling the judge as
a witness.
The trial court failed to rule on defendant' s motion for a new
trial, which warrants the case be remanded for decision by a
different district court judge.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to theft, a third degree

9

felony, where (a) the court failed to explain to the defendant the
facts and elements of the crime charged, (b) the record reveals
the

defendant

had

trouble

hearing

and

understanding

the

proceedings, (c) the record reveals that defendant and his counsel
were confused as to the crime charged and the plea bargain, and
(d) the trial court did not adequately examine the defendant to
determine if his plea of guilty was knowing and voluntary.
Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
His performance was prejudicial and deficient in the following
areas:

(1) Defense

defendant.

counsel

failed

to

withdraw

as

to

A direct conflict of interest was presented

one
when

defense counsel called upon one defendant to plead guilty while
charges were dismissed

against the co-defendant;

(2) defense

counsel failed to assert valid defenses, call essential witnesses,
and become familiar with the facts and the testimony of his own
client; and (3) defense counsel should have moved to disqualify
the trial judge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
TRIAL
JUDGE
ERRED
BY
NOT
DISPOSING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE PRIOR TO RULING ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
PLEA.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
If the . . . defendant . . . files an affidavit
that the judge . . . has a bias or prejudice,
10

the judge shall proceed no further until the
challenge is disposed of.
Utah Code Ann, § 77-35-29(d) addresses the appropriate steps
a challenged judge must take to dispose of the issue.
If
the
challenged
judge
questions
the
sufficiency
of
the
allegation
of
disqualification, he shall enter an order
directing that a copy be forthwith certified to
another named judge of the same court . . . ,
which judge shall then pass on the legal
sufficiency of the allegations.
If the
challenged judge does not question the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge
to whom the affidavit is certified finds the
affidavit to be legally sufficient, another
judge shall be called to try the case or to
conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified does not find the
affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall
enter a finding to that effect and the
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or
proceeding.
Defendant submitted his affidavit, motion to disqualify judge,
memorandum

in support thereof, and certificate of counsel on

August 24, 1989.

The Fifth District Court stamped the above-

referenced documents "filed" August 28, 1989, three days prior to
the Courtfs memorandum decision dated September 1, 1989 and filed
September 5, 1989 (R. 215-234).

However, the trial judge totally

ignored defendant's motion to disqualify judge and the above-cited
mandatory statutes and remained on the case to deny defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea.
The cannons of judicial ethics clearly state that a judge
should disqualify himself where his impartiality may be reasonably
questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
11

(a)

The judge has . . . personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts . . .;

(b)

The judge had served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, . . . or has been
a material witness concerning it;

See Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(a) and (b).
The judge may, instead of withdrawing, disclose on the record
or in writing the basis of his disqualification to which the
lawyers

and

parties

can

all

agree

to

waive

the

basis

for

disqualification and allow the judge to continue on the case.
See Code of Judicial Conduct 3(D).

In the instant case, the

trial judge failed to disclose his involvement in the underlying
transaction which now serves as the foundation for the criminal
allegations against the defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated,
The general practice in this jurisdiction is
for judges to disqualify themselves whenever an
affidavit of bias or prejudice against them has
been filed. As a general rule we think this is
a commendable practice.
The purity and integrity of the judicial
process ought to be protected against any taint
of suspicion to the end that the public and
litigants may have the highest confidence in
the integrity and fairness of the courts.
Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948).
The Haslam court stated that " . . .

it is ordinarily better

for judges to disqualify themselves even though he may be free of
bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of bias
and prejudice."

_Id. at 523.
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In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219
(Utah

1988),

the Utah Supreme Court

stated

that one of the

fundamental principals of due process is that all parties to a
case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge.

Fairness not

only requires an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent
even the possibility of unfairness.
In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court quoted Justice Wade in his concurring opinion in the Haslam
decision wherein he said:
I can think of nothing that would as surely
bring the courts into disrepute as for a judge
to insist on trying a case where one of the
litigants believes that such a judge is bias
and prejudice against him.
In Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1985), the Supreme
Court held that:
We have the utmost confidence in Judge Player? s
ability
to remain impartial despite his
previous involvement with the Kniffens over ten
years ago in a similar suit. The appearance of
impropriety, however, compels us to order the
assignment of another judge on remand.
The trial court's failure to properly consider and dispose of
defendant's motion to disqualify the judge not only reveals the
appearance of impropriety but further taints defendantf s suspicion
that the Court is prejudice.
The defendant contends that the trial judge should not have
ruled on defendantT s motion to withdraw his plea nor presided over
the trial because the trial judge, while a practicing attorney,
13

represented the Beaver Valley Grazing Association in its bid to
purchase the Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale and was a
witness to the actual sale.

(R. 216).

The Beaver Valley Grazing Association and other potential
bidders, were excluded from the bidding process by attorney Ken
Chamberlain at the first partition sale in 1978.

(R. 220-221).

To protect its interest at the second partition sale in 1981, the
Beaver Valley Grazing Association retained the trial judge before
he was appointed to the District Court (R. 215-216).
The State's criminal case is based on the assumption that the
defendant was legally disposed of his one-sixth interest in the
Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale and, therefore, he did
not have legal authority
others.

to subsequently

lease the ranch to

The defendant believes the 1981 sale was void and thus

it cannot serve as a foundation for the instant criminal charge
of theft.

(R. 217).

To establish

the sale is void, the defendant

intends on

calling as witnesses those present at the 1981 sales, including the
trial judge and his client, the Beaver Valley Grazing Association.
However, Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Evidences precludes the
judge presiding at the trial from testifying as a witness.

No

objection is necessary in order to preserve the issue.
There is no way for defendant to obtain the information the
trial judge possesses without calling the judge as a witness,
cross-examining the trial judge, and questioning his client, all
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of which raises substantial conflicts pointing to the conclusion
the trial judge must be disqualified.
Moreover, the defendant has no way of knowing if the trial
judge relied on information from his former client or from being
at the actual partition sale in 1981, when ruling on matters of
law in defendant's criminal case.

Even more troublesome, the

trial judge was the factfinder in defendant's criminal trial. The
defendant was always lead to believe his case would be tried to
a jury until he arrived at court on January 25, 1989 and was
requested to waive his right to a jury.

In response to the

request that he waive the jury and have the trial judge decide the
facts, the following exchange took place:
Mr. Spafford:

And do you understand also that
Judge
Eves would
have
the
additional
responsibility
of
applying the law to the facts
that he finds to exist?

Mr. F. Gentry: Yes.
Mr. Spafford:

Now, are you satisfied with us
proceeding in that fashion?

Mr. F. Gentry: No.
C).

(Tr. 6 attached to Addendum

Because of the change of directions by defendant's prior
defense counsel, advising defendant to accept a plea bargain
before a verdict was rendered by the court, the trial court did
not have placed before it the decision to determine defendant's
guilt or innocence.

However, the trial judge went one step

further and found the defendant guilty in response to defendant's
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motion to withdraw his plea.

(R. 233).

Again, the issue of

defendant's guilt or innocence was not before the trial judge.
The trial judge's failure to recuse himself based on the
appearance of bias and prejudice and being not only a witness but
also a lawyer who represented a client wishing to dispossess
defendant of his interest in the Fremont Ranch, substantially
impacted defendantf s rights to a fair proceeding and warrants
reversal

of

the

trial

judge's

memorandum

decision

denying

defendantf s motion to withdraw his plea and entitles defendant to
a new trial presided over by an impartial District Court Judge.
(See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30

(Repealed

effective

July 1,

1990)).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT
D I S P O S ING
OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) provides "that a court may, upon
motion of a party . . . , grant a new trial in the interest of
justice

if

there

is

any

error

or

impropriety

which

had

a

substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Defendant

served

his

speaking

motion on August

24, 1989

asserting that the 1981 partition sale is void, to which the
Court has not heard testimony from all of the witnesses, and that
the defendant is not guilty.

The trial court did not rule on

defendant's motion for a new trial.
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Therefore, defendant prays

that the case be remanded to a different district court judge for
ruling on his motion for a new trial.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO THEFT,
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY.
A.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY TO THEFT, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE.

In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the high court
stated that a plea of guilty is not an intelligent voluntary
admission that he committed

the offense unless the defendant

received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against
him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due
process."

!Id. at 645, (cited in State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309,

1312).
1.

The Trial Court Failed to Explain to the Defendant
the Elements and Facts to the Crime of Theft Before
Defendant Pled Guilty.

In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) the Supreme
Court, in construing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, stated:
that the factual elements of the charges
against the defendant must be explained in the
taking of the guilty plea so that defendant
understands and admits those elements: because
a guilty plea is an admission of all the
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot
be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses the understanding of the law in
relationship to the facts . . . .
. . . The judge must determine that the conduct
which the defendant admits constitutes the
offense
charged
in
the
indictment
or
17

information or an offense included therein to
which the defendant has pleaded guilty, . . .
There is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time of the
plea is entered the defendants understanding
of the nature of the charge against him.
(Emphasis added). Id. at 466, 467, 470; (cited
in State v. Gibbons at 1313).
The pertinent parts of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(5) provides:
(5)

The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty . . . and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
*

(b)

*

the plea is voluntarily made;
*

(d)

*

*

*

the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering
the plea, that upon trial the
prosecution
would
have
the
burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements:
*

*

*

if the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
Rule 11(5) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring

that Constitutional

and Rule

11(5) requirements

complied with when a guilty plea is entered.
740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987).
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are

State v. Gibbons,

In reviewing the transcript of Defendant's plea of guilty on
January

25,

1989,

the

court

totally

failed

to

explain

the

elements of the crime and the relationship of the law to the
facts as required under Gibbons and Rule 11.

(Tr. 176-181).

Moreover, the trial court failed to strictly comply with the
rule.

State v. Valencia, 766 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989);

Accord State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988).
The defendant did not understand the facts or elements of the
crime to which he plead guilty.
that he is not guilty of theft.
2.

Moreover, defendant maintains
(R. 142).

The Trial Court Erred By Relying On An Incomplete
Record As a Substitute For Failing to Comply with
Rule 11.

The trial court concluded in its memorandum decision, denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, that the court did not
explain the elements of the offense to the defendant during the
change of plea nor determined a factual basis for entry of the
plea of guilty because the defendant had been through a trial.
(R. 230-233).
The position now taken by the trial court is similar to the
case of Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (filed August 22,
1989),

wherein

the

Supreme

Court

held

that

Rule

11

can

be

complied with if the whole record affirmatively establishes that
the

defendant

entered

his

plea

understanding of its consequences.

with

full

Id. at 18.

knowledge

and

However, the

trial court cannot presume from a silent or incomplete record
19

that the defendant understands the elements of the offense and
the relationship of the law and the facts.

State v. Valencia,

776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989).
Contrary to Jolivet, the whole record in the instant case
supports defendant's motion to withdraw his plea because nowhere
in the record does the court explain the elements and facts of
the offense to the defendant to elicit defendantT s responses to
determine if he understands the crime he is pleading to and that
his admission is knowing and voluntary.
five

examples

demonstrate

that

not

Moreover, the following
only

was

the

defendant

confused, but so was his counsel.
First,

defendant

was

originally

Deception and Criminal Trespass.

charged

with

Theft

by

However, according to the court

records, the Information was not filed until August 30, 1989,
four days after the preliminary hearing.

(R. 26-28).

Second, at the preliminary hearing, the State proceeded on
the charge of Theft by Deception but the clerk indicated in the
minutes that the defendant was bound over on a charge of Theft.
However, Judge Braithwaite signed a bindover order dated August
26, 1989, binding defendant over to the Fifth District Court on
the charge of Theft by Deception.

(R. 24, 25).

Third, at defendant's arraignment on September 20, 1989, the
court

required

Defendant

defense

counsel

on Arraignment.

to

In the

fill

out

affidavit

an Affidavit
it

states

defendant is charged with Theft, a Third Degree Felony.
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of

that

However,

defense counsel incorrectly listed the maximum penalty as 1 to 15
years and the maximum fine as $10,000•

The affidavit did not set

forth the elements or facts to the crime of Theft

(R. 31-37).

Fourth, the defendant plead not guilty at this arraignment
but

the

prosecutor

signed

the

affidavit

coerced defendant to plead guilty,

stating

he had

not

(R. 31-37).

Fifth, further confusion is revealed on January 25, 1989, the
day of defendant's trial.
their

trial memorandum

On that day defense counsel submitted

to

the court.

The

trial

memorandum

incorrectly addressed the crime of Theft by Deception as opposed
to the charge of Theft.

(R. 55). The State finally

filed its

Amended Information, which alleges Theft, on January 25, 1989.
3.

The Defendant's Hearing Impairment.

In addition to the foregoing, defendant, at trial, had a
difficult

time

transpired.

hearing

The

the

trial

testimony

court

and

was made

understanding

aware

of

defendant's

hearing problem at the start of the trial.
Mr. Kimball:

Excuse me one second, your
Honor, my client Frank Gentry is
a little hard of hearing, so we
may need sometimes to repeat
things or to speak as loudly as
possible.

The Court:

We'll certainly try to do that,
can you hear me alright, Mr.
Gentry?

Mr. F. Gentry: Yes.
I would appreciate if
you'd talk slow and with a
little more volume, please in a
low tone.
(Tr. 8 attached to
Addendum D ) .
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what

The record also reveals that at times during the trial the
defendant

was

having

difficulty

hearing.

(Tr.

126). More

importantly, defendant did not adequately hear and understand the
plea agreement presented to the court.

Defense counsel and the

trial court discuss the plea agreement for 2-1/2 pages explaining
what

the defendant will do.

(Tr. 164-166).

After

defense

counsel concluded explaining the agreement he asked defendant if
he understands.
Mr. Spafford:

Now, may I ask Frank, if you
understand what I said?

Mr. F. Gentry: I have to say I couldn't hear it
all, Earl.
Mr. Spafford:

All right.
What I've done is
repeated exactly what I told you
in the hall* Did you understand
that?

Mr. F. Gentry: Yes.
(Tr.
166
Addendum D ) .

attached

to

There is no record of what was conveyed to the defendant in
the hallway and whether he understood it.

On March 8, 1989,

defendant's trial counsel submitted a letter and his affidavit to
the court stating the defendant did not fully understand the plea
bargain and was having difficulty hearing5 on January 25, 1989.
(R. 115, 152-153).
the

defendant

The trial court has the burden to make sure

understands

the

5

plea

agreement

before

going

To verify defendant's hearing impairment, he was referred
to a medical doctor for tests. Said test results and his doctor's
letter are attached to Addendum D.
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forward.

(Rule

ll(5)(f)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure.)
In response to his attorney's question whether he understands
the agreement, the defendant starts questioning whether he can
visit his father's grave on the Fremont Ranch, how to get his
property, can he fly over the ranch, and whether he can drive on
the road by the ranch.

This goes on for 10 pages (Tr. 166-176).

In contrast to its memorandum decision, the record reveals the
trial

court

clearly

recognized

that

the

plea

agreement

was

complicated and that defendant had a hearing problem but waited
until after the agreement had been discussed for approximately
12-1/2 pages before requesting the defendant to step forward to
make sure he heard what the court said.

(Tr. 174 attached to

Addendum E ) .
The Court:

All right, Mr. Frank Gentry,
will you come forward and stand
up
here
by your
attorney,
please. Just stand right there.
This is fine. Just stand right
here close so I can talk to you,
Frank.
I want you to be in a
position where you can hear me.
(Tr. 176 attached to Addendum
E).

After the trial court finally had the defendant come closer
to hear, it did not repeat what was discussed for 12-1/2 pages,
what

was

discussed

in

the

hall

between

defendant

and

his

attorney, and no mention was made of the elements and facts to
the crime to which he was asked to plead guilty.
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4.

The Trial Court Did Not Use An Affidavit.

Even

though

the

trial

court

required

an

affidavit

at

defendant's arraignment, no affidavit was utilized for defendant
to plead guilty.
place

to make

Many courts rely on affidavits as a starting

sure

the defendant

knows

and

understands

the

elements and facts of the crime charged.
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court said that a sufficient
affidavit is a starting point but should not be an end point in
the pleading process.

A sufficient affidavit is one which is

signed by the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the
trial judge which lists the names and degrees of the crimes
charged.
The affidavit6 should contain both
the statement of the elements of the
offenses
and
synopsis
of
the
defendants acts that establish the
elements of the crimes charged. The
affidavit should clearly state the
allowable punishment for the crimes
charged and should note that multiple
punishments for multiple crimes may
be imposed consecutively. . . . The
details of any plea bargain should be
set forth in the affidavit, as well
as the disclaimer concerning any
sentencing
recommendations
as
required by Rule 11(e).
(Emphasis
added). Gibbons at 1313. . . .
The trial judge should then review
the statements in the affidavit with
the defendant, question the defendant
concerning his understanding of it,
and fulfill the other requirements
imposed by § 77-35-11 on the record
6

See R. 252 for a sample affidavit which sets out a section
for "elements" and "facts."
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before accepting the guilty plea. If
a court does not use an affidavit,
the requirements set forth above and
in § 77-35-11 must still be followed
and be on the record.
(Emphasis
added). Gibbons at 1314.
"This procedure may take additional time, but constitutional
rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy".
Gibbons at 1314.
The

precise

issue

of

whether

defendantf s plea

was

made

knowingly and voluntarily was addressed by the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos,

756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988),

(trial court failed to find defendant understood the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences), and by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266
(Utah

1988)

(remanded

to

trial

court

to

determine

exact

recommendations, defendant's understanding of it, and the value
of

recommendations).

In

Vasilacopulos

and

Copeland,

the

respective courts concluded that the record did not support the
requirement that the defendants understand what they are doing
when pleading and reversed.
In

the

instance

case,

the

record

reveals

that

the

requirements enunciated in State v. Gibbons were not followed and
therefore, Frank Gentry's plea must be withdrawn.
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B.

DEFENDANT AND DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE
PLEA AGREEMMENT.

Not until defendant retained present counsel did he realize
he had been convicted of a felony by entering his plea.

(R. 141-

142).
Moreover, his prior counsel misunderstood the plea agreement
and

thought

defendantf s plea

was

held

in

abeyance

thought meant defendant is not convicted of a crime.

which

he

(R. 150,

153, 154).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial and effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States

Constitution

Constitution.
issue

of

and

Article

1,

Section

12

of

the

The United States Supreme Court addressed

effective

assistance

of

counsel

in

Strickland

Utah
the
v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In Strickland, the court established a two prong test for
analysis of the effective assistance of counsel.

First, the

Court required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's
performance.

The court defined "deficient performance" as that

falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness.

The

second prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.

To prove prejudice,

the defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional
26

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A

reasonable

probability

is

a

"probability

undermine confidence in the outcome."

sufficient

to

Strickland at 694.

The Utah Supreme Court has defined prejudice as a reasonable
likelihood that without counsel's error, a different result would
have occurred.

State v. Gray, 601 P. 2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979).

In

State v. Spear, 750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
court adopted the approach suggested in Strickland

"if it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice. . . . "

_Id. at 192.

Accord, State

v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
A.

COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT HE FAILED TO
ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR TRIAL AND ASSIST DEFENDANT.
1.

Counsel Failed
Defendant.

to Disqualify

Himself As to One

Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person or by the
lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably
the
representation
will
adversely affected, and
(2) each client
consultation.

believes
not
be

consents

after

The general rule is that the lawyer in a criminal case should
decline to represent more than one co-defendant and the court is
generally required to raise the conflict issue when a lawyer
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represents

multiple

defendants•

(See

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Comments to Rule
1.7).
In the instant case, both defendants were represented by the
same

lawyer

Although

at

trial

trial

and

counsel

through

may

the

have

plea

bargain process.

reasonably

believed

both

defendants had similar interests during the trial, those similar
interests undisputedly dissipated when defense counsel called
upon one defendant to plead guilty while the other defendant had
the charges dismissed.
The plea bargain agreement in this case clearly illustrates
that two defendants in a criminal case cannot be represented by
the same attorney.

The court failed to address this issue even

in light of defendant's reluctance to plead guilty.

For example,

after the court questioned the defendant as to whether he wanted
to plead guilty to Count I, the following exchange took place:
Mr. Spafford:

I think you better.

Mr. F. Gentry:

Yes.

(Tr. 177).

As to the actual plea, the court asked how Mr. Gentry pleads:
Mr. Spafford:

Guilty.

Mr. F. Gentry:

Guilty.
*

The Court:

*

(Tr. 181).

*

Will you accept probation on those
terms?

Mr. F. Gentry: I have no alternative.
187).
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(Tr. 186-

Defendant's trial counsel has now submitted to the court his
letter and affidavit stating that he believes the defendant did
not

understand

the

plea

agreement.

If

defendant

had

the

assistance of separate and independent counsel to advise him
whether to accept or reject the plea agreement, the result in
this case would have been different.
2.

Counsel Failed to Adequately
Witnesses and Valid Defenses.

Investigate

The Facts,

The two valid defenses in this case are defendant's lack of
intent to commit a theft and his collateral attack on the 1981
Partition sale as being void, thus, having no legal force or
effect.

However, trial counsel asserted the theories of adverse

possession and prescriptive easement, defenses that are totally
without merit given the instant facts.
It is clear from the record that defendant did not pay the
taxes on the Fremont Ranch during the claimed period of adverse
possession.
fails.

(Tr. 147).

Thus, a claim for adverse possession

Neeley v. Relsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979); Accord

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).
More obvious than defendant not paying the Fremont Ranch
taxes as required to establish adverse possession, is the fact
that defendant was a tenant-in-common with relatives.
Defense counsel, without question, should have been aware of
Massey v. Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983), as it is cited in
the Notes to Decisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7, which is the
Adverse Possession statute.
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In Massey, the court held that co-tenant's acts must be more
than simple acts of possession, maintenance, paying taxes, making
improvements on the property, fencing the land and farming the
land to establish adverse possession.
tenant-in-common

can

begin

to

_Xd. at 1180.

establish

adverse

Before a
possession

against another co-tenant, the one in possession, must, either by
speech or by acts of "the most open and notorious character, "
clearly

show that his possession

rights of the other co-tenants.

is intended

to exclude the

McCready v. Fredericksen, 41

Utah 388, 126 P. 316, 320 (Utah 1917).

Defendant testified he

never claimed to own all of the property or to exclude the other
co-tenants.7

(Tr. 126).

Even though the Utah Supreme Court will not second-guess an
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or
strategy, the defense of adverse possession relied on by defense
counsel

clearly

performance.

demonstrates

his

ineffective

and

deficient

See State v. McNicol, 554 P. 2d 203, 205

(Utah

1976).
Had defense counsel advanced the defenses of lack of intent
to commit a theft or that the partition sale is void, which the
facts

and

testimony

support,

7

and

called

the

appropriate

Where the co-tenants are close relatives, as in the case at
hand, even the lapse of forty years is insufficient to establish
adverse possession. Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 57, 404 P. 2d
253, 257 (Utah 1965).
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witnesses,8 the state could not have proven defendant's guilt

Defense counsel should have called as witnesses, the Beaver
Valley Grazing Association, Judge J. Philip Eves, Ron Bradshaw,
Bryan Hafen, and Mitchell Schoppman to establish that the 1979 and
1981 partition sale was void. Moreover, defense counsel should
have
submitted
evidence that would
show defendant
made
improvements to the Fremont Ranch with the lease money as he has
done for the past twenty years, without incident. Thus defendant
had no intent to deprive the other owners.
Furthermore, trial counsel failed to make a clear record as
to the prior litigation between defendant and his brothers and
sisters.
The record refers to the partition sale of 1981.
However, the prior litigation was commenced and captioned as
follows:
Mack R. Gentry, Joseph F. Gentry, Mary Lou Roberts, Ruby Jane
Roberts, Glenda S. Hawley, for herself and as the surviving wife
and administrator of the estate of William Larry Gentry, deceased,
William Larry Gentry and Andrea Breinholt, plaintiffs v. Frank D.
Gentry, et al., defendants, Civil No. 6763, filed on March 7, 1975
in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, Utah.
The 1975 civil lawsuit was filed in response to Ken
Chamberlain's material misrepresentations of what took place at
the probate hearing on November 20, 1974.
Because of those
representations, defendant's brothers and sisters, unbeknownst to
defendant, agreed to give 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch to Ken
Chamberlain to recover their interest in the ranch.
Ken
Chamberlain did not disclose his ownership to the Court when the
Court ordered the property sold.
Acting not only as counsel for co-tenant plaintiffs, but also
as a silent owner of part of the property to be sold, Ken
Chamberlain advised and consented to postponement of the
judicially-ordered Sheriff's sale to allow Bryan Hafen to buy the
ranch for $368,000, almost $100,000 more than the appraisal value
of December 14, 1977 and almost 18 times the value established in
1974 at the probate of Ivy Jane Erickson's Estate.
Bryan Hafen did not meet the established deadline so Ken
Chamberlain filed in the Fifth District Court of Iron County, on
February 10, 1978, a document entitled Order of Sale, ordering the
Fremont Ranch to be sold at a public auction on March 14, 1978 at
12 o'clock noon at the steps of the Iron County Courthouse in
Parowan, Utah. Several bidders appeared at the sale, however,
only Bryan Hafen was allowed into a closed room to negotiate with
Ken Chamberlain. Without disclosing his interest in the Fremont
(continued...)
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beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

COUNSELTS PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT HE FAILED TO
MOVE TO DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL JUDGE.

As discussed in Point I of this brief at pp. 10-16, the trial
judge, while a practicing

attorney, represented

a client who

attempted to dispossess defendant of his one-sixth interest in
the Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale.
is

premised

on

the

assumption

that

the

The state's case

1981

sale

lawfully

dispossessed defendant of his interest in the ranch.

Defendant

disputes the validity of the 1981 partition sale.

The trial

judge witnessed the 1981 sale.

(...continued)
Ranch, Ken Chamberlain had Bryan Hafen agree to buy his clients'
five-sixths interest in the Fremont Ranch for $300,000. As part
of this transaction, Ken Chamberlain required defendant to
mortgage his one-sixth interest through a series of questionable
events. Bryan Hafen could not obtain a loan and defaulted which
prompted Ken Chamberlain to file a suit on behalf of defendant's
brothers and sisters against Bryan Hafen and defendant to
foreclose on the mortgage.
That lawsuit was captioned Mack
Gentry, et al. v. Bryan Hafen, Frank D. Gentry, et al., Civil No.
7948. Of interest, Ken Chamberlain and his partner, Tex Olsen,
were listed as plaintiffs. The default judgment was set aside.
In 1981, the Fifth District Court ordered a third sale of the
Fremont Ranch. The Beaver Valley Grazing Association had appeared
at the prior sale to bid on the property but Ken Chamberlain did
not allow them to bid.
Therefore, Beaver Valley Grazing
Association retained J. Philip Eves to represent its interest at
the 1981 sale.
At the 1981 sale, bids were made. Defendant's brothers and
sisters credit bid their interest and bought the Fremont Ranch
paying defendant approximately $22,000 which he refused to take.
Ken Chamberlain ended up with Parcel C, 640 acres. Defendant has
strenuously objected to the validity of the sale and continually
tried to halt the sale to preserve his one-sixth interest.
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Predicated on Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the
appearance of bias or prejudice, defendants trial counsel should
have moved to disqualify the trial judge.

Trial counelfs failure

to move to disqualify the trial judge precluded defendant from
calling the judge and his client as witnesses to collaterally
establish that the 1981 partition is void.
right

to

a

fair

trial

by

an

Moreover, defendant's

impartial

judge

was

totally

disregarded by his prior counsel's failure to disqualify a judge
who represented a client who attempted to dispossess defendant of
his interest in the Fremont Ranch.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, defendant seeks
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District
Court for dismissal of the charge or in the alternative a new
trial presided over by a different judge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/**

day of December, 1989

WADDSUPST
J2
of and for
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

GEORGE\&.

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, George Waddoups, hereby certify that seven copies of the
foregoing were hand delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102, and four
copies were hand delivered to the Attorney General's Office, R.
Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84114, this

/U-

day of December, 1989.

Delivered by ^v»/»r»j UaeldbUfA this
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day of December, 19 89,

ADDENDUM A

GEORGE T. WADDOUPS, (#3965)
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 363-3300
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
RUBY JANE (GENTRY) ROBERTS

vs.

:

FRANK DAVID GENTRY,

:

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant,.

:

Criminal No. 1232

STATE OF MONTANA
COUNTY OF FERGUS

)
: ss.
)

RUBY JANE (GENTRY) ROBERTS, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of

Fergus

County, State of Montana,

over the age of twenty-one (21) and make this affidavit based upon
my personal knowledge.
2.

By consanguinity,

I am a sister to the defendant Frank

Gentry and a daughter to Milton H. Gentry and Ivy Jane (Erickson)
Gentry, both deceased.

3.

I presently own a one-fifth interest, as a tenant in

common, in the Fremont Ranch in Iron County, Utah.
4.

That Ken Chamberlain was engaged to make sure the estate

of Milton H. Gentry and the estate of Ivy Jane Erickson were
properly probated.
5.

That Ken Chamberlain mailed a letter dated November 20,

1974 to Joseph F. Gentry, Mack R. Gentry, Mary Lou Roberts, Ruby
Jane Roberts, and Glenda S. Hawley stating that Frank D. Gentry
td
ill

fS

f Si
in

•

< *
*

CO

M
0

appeared at the Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry estate probate hearing
on November 10, 1974, claiming 100% interest in the her estate and
the Milton H. Gentry estate and that he is entitled to all of the
property.

t

in

D

2

>•"

0

hJ

li.

<

£ 5

6.

Mr. Chamberlain stated in his November 20, 1974 letter

that there would

be three

lawsuits

(1) one

in the

Ivy Jane

J

(Erickson) Gentry estate, (2) one in the Milton H. Gentry estate,
and (3) a partition action if the judge decides Frank Gentry is
not entitled to all of the claimed interests (See Exhibit A ) .
7.

Mr. Chamberlain stated unless he prevails or makes some

recovery for us no fee will be assessed.

Mr. Chamberlain stated

he needed 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch to undertake our representation
but ended up with 1/3 of the Fremont Ranch, approximately 640
acres.

Frank D. Gentry never filed a single lawsuit.

the impression we had to defend his claims.

I was under

8.

Mr. Chamberlain mailed me a copy of the Court's Order

which included the representations Mr. Chamberlain claimed Frank
D. Gentry had made at the probate hearing.
9.

(See Exhibit B ) .

Based on Mr. Chamberlain's representations and the Court

Order which stated that Frank D. Gentry claimed 100% interest in
the

property,

I

agreed

to

take

legal

action

to

defend

my

interests.
10.
Montana.

During August 1989, Frank D. Gentry came to visit me in
While Frank was visiting, I told him that I and some of

the other heirs would not have taken legal action to protect our
interests had he not claimed total ownership of the Fremont Ranch
at the probate hearing in 1974. As always, Frank D. Gentry denied
saying this.
Court's Order.

I brought up Mr. Chamberlain's
Frank D. Gentry recommended

letter and the
that I read the

November 20, 1974 transcript of the probate hearing.
11.

Since our conversation in August, 1989, I have obtained

a copy of the transcript of the probate hearing and learned that
Frank D. Gentry was telling the truth and that Mr. Chamberlain had
apparently stated his comments in error or fabricated them (See
Exhibit C ) .
12.

I have since discovered that Mr. Chamberlain prepared the

Order for the court to sign which included inaccurate information
I relied on. Had the above representations not been made, I would

3

not have agreed to initiate legal action to dispossess my brother,
Frank D. Gentry, of his one-sixth interest in the Fremont Ranch.
DATED this

30th day of November, 1989.

L
RUBY JANE

\J

\

iwk.

^GENTRY)

""T~~

V

1

";

ROBERTS
NOVEMBER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of -Oetebe^,
1989
UJ
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Residing at:
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My C o m m i s s i o n
Q9-24-9Q

Expires:
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OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
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CHAMBERLAIN
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SOUTH
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TELEPMON E

« . , . „ . , • , „ , « . * « .^w«
RICHFIELD, UTAH §4701

S a a - « * a i

November 20, 1974

Joseph F. Gentry
Mack R. Gentry
Mary Lou Roberts
Ruby Jane Roberts
Glenda S. Hawley
Dear Folks:
At the probate hearing held this morning Frank Gentry
and his wife and two oldest boys appeared and lodged a formal
personal objection to all further probate proceedings and to the
Decree of Distribution and asked that the Administrators, Mack R.
Gentry and Joseph F. Gentry be discharged and that the entire estate
be awarded to Frank Gentry because of the "30 years'1 which he states
he has spent on the property.
Frank stated that he had engaged the services of an attorney,
Patrick H. Fenton of Cedar City, Utah to represent him in this lawsuit.
The Judge gave Mr. Fenton two weeks within which to file
written protests and then will set the case for trial one month from
now for a certain time to be decided at the second Law and Motion
Day in December, 1974.
Frank also is claiming thathe has now acquired a 100 per
cent Interest in the Milton H. Gentry estate and that he is entitled
to all of the property and also entitled to a lien on it for approximately $30,000.00 for his personal services. We are going to have
three lawsuits:
(1) The one in the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate here in
Sevier County.
(2) The one in Iron County for the estate of Milton
H. Gentry, and
(3) The partition action which will divide the property
out if the Judge should decide that Frank is not going to be entitled
to all of the interests as he claims he is.

t - w or rices

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
RICHFIELD. UTAH 84701

-

2 -

In this regard it is necessary for us to have a firm
agreement with you concerning our legal representation of you. You
will need to be adequately represented in this case to counter
against Frank's claim to be asserted by his attorney, that he has
acquired undisputed total entitlement to the property.
These three lawsuits will be time consuming and complicated
for our office. In addition to that we will have a fee coming for
probate of the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate which we have not billed
as yet.
We have previously discussed taking this case on a contingent
fee basis and the only ^ay we would be interested in assuming these c r r ^
complicated lawsuits Wuuiu be on a contingent tee of one-fourth (l/4y
of the property re<- ^red. Ultimately, as you will see from the
enclosed form of rec ler, "Retainer for Legal Services11 the fees are
one-third (1/3) but we will be willing to accept this case on a onefourth basis provided it is agreeable with all of the heirs.
I am enclosing a form fcr each of you to sign and a returnaddressed, stamped envelope for you to return if the Retainer \greement
is satisfactory to you.
You will notice from the Retainer Agreement that unless we
prevail or make some recovery for you no fee will be payable to us.
We anticipate that our services to date in defending the
lawsuit brought by Morgan Barlow against the heirs and against the
prorerty, in probating the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate, and the collective
work in the Milton H. Gentry estate would run approximately $5,000.00
with our expenses. All of that would be a part of the Retainer Agreement as well as work we will do in the future which will be several
times that which we have already done.
If this appears satisfactory to you, please sign and return
tt.e enclosed Retaiuei Agreement in ti«e scanipeu, r«s;:u«.n-&aarei>i»ed envelope.
Yours very truly,
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
\*

By
KC:gln

^~~-^
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DEVON P0UJ30N, C'3rk

OLSEN AND C H A M B E R L A I N
ATTORNEYS F O P AnMTWTSTBATnpg
7 6 S O U T H MAIN STREET
R I C H F I E L D . UTAH 8 4 7 0 1
TELEPHONE: 896-4461

IN THE DISTRICT COURT, PROBATE DIVISION, OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

)
O R D E R

OF

)
Probate No. 3230

IVY JANE ERICKSON GENTRY, also
known as IVY JANE ERICKSON,
Deceased,

The above entitled matter came on before the Court on the
First and Final Account and Report of Administration and Petition
for Decree of Final Distribution of Joseph F. Gentry and Mack R.
Gentry, Administrators of the Estate of Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry,,
also known as Ivy Jane Erickson, deceased;
The Court FINDS that due, legal and timely notice upon
said Account, Report and Petition was given to the persons, for
the time and in the manner provided by law and as ordered by
the Court;
At said hearing Frank D. Gentry appeared and objected to
the entry of a Decree of Distribution, requested that the Admini-j
strators be discharged and that an Administrator from Beaver
County and one from Sevier County be appointed in substitution
and asserted that he had a claim to all of the property sought
to be distributed and that the other heirs had no interest

-2Whereupon the Court was advised that the objector, Frank
D. Gentry, was represented by Patrick H. Fenton, Esquire, of
Cedar City who could not attend the hearing and who requested
time within which to make a formal appearance and file objections; whereupon Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for the Administrato]
agreed that Mr. Frank D. Gentry and his legal counsel be allowec
two weeks within which to file formal written objections to the
Account, Report and Petition for Final Distribution and that the
matter be continued for one month or until the second Law and
Motion Day in December (the 18th day of December, 1974) at whici
time the Court will determine what issues, if any, are presentee
by the written objections and protests and, if any issues are
presented, then the matter will be set for trial.. If no issues
are presented, the Court will rule upon the Account, Report and
Petition for Decree of Distribution at the second Law and Motioi
Day in December or as soon thereafter as the Court determines
appropriate;
The Court ORDERS that Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for the
Administrators, give notice of this ruling by mailing a copy of
this Order to the Protestant personally and to his Attorney,
Patrick H. Fenton, and to all of the other heirs at law of the
decedent so that any person who wishes to file formal written
objections to the Account, Report, and Petition for Final Distr:
bution of the Administrators, may do so which filing must be mac
within two weeks from date hereof or on or before the 4th day oJ
December, 1974.
"DATED-5HIS 20fk

DAY OF DECEMBER*. 1974.

DON^Vw T I p S ,

DISTRICT JUDGfc

LUKilirlCATE OF SER^fE
SERVED the within and foregoing Order upon the following
by mailing a full, true, and correct copy thereof, U. S. Mail,
Postage Prepaid, this 20th day of November, 1974:
Mr. Frank D. Gentry, 307 North Third West,
Richfield, Utah (84701)
Mr. Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney for Protestant,
Frank D. Gentry, Attorney at Law, Cedar City, Utah
Mr. Joseph F. Gentry, 190 West First North,
Richfield, Utah (84701)
Mr. Mack R. Gentry, 240 West First North,
Richfield, Utah(84701)
Mrs. Mary Lou Roberts, 165 North 1225 West,
Cedar City, Utah (84720)
Mrs. Ruby Jane Roberts, Route #1, Box #88,
Wadsworth, Illinois (60083)
Mrs. Glenda S. Gentry, Monroe RFD, Utah
William Larry Gentry, 137 Brooks Parkway,
San Antonio, Texas (78214)
Andrea Mack, Richfield, Utah

Ken Chamberlain

'

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE CF UTAH

IN THE MATTER Op THE ESTATE
PROBATE NO. 3230
OF
IVY JANE ERICKSON GENTRY/
a l s o known a s IVY JANE
ERICKSON,

TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS

Deceased#

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled
action came before the Court sitting without a jury on
Wednesday, the 20th day of November, 197^, at the hour of
i

10:00 O'clock A. M., before zhe Honorable Don V. Tibbs,

!

District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District of the State

:

of Utah in and for Sevier County, in the Courtroom of the

!

Sevier Couaty Courthouse as Richfield, Sevier County, State!
of Utah.

!
i

L 2 2 I i 2 LI 2L 1
;-:en Chamberlain
01sen & Chamberlain
A"orneys at Law
75 South Main
Richfield, Utah 84701
FOR THE ESTATE
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had:

!
j
j
j
!

THE COURT:

This Is in the matter of

the Estate of Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry, also known as ivy
3

Jane Erickson, deceased.

*H

attorney,

I notice Mr, Chamberlain is the i
j
i

I
0

MR. CKA;>3ERLAIN:

That's right, Your Honor.

6

I T m attorney for the petitioners asking for approval of

'

the First and Final Account and Report of Administration

8

and petition for Decree of Final Distribution.

9

|

10
11

THE COURT:

What is the situation,

Counsel?
MR. CHA'lEEEI^IN:

12

Just a petition distriGentry
buting the interest of Ivy Jane Erickson/in certain real

13

property in Iron County, Utah, to the heirs at lav/.

14

died without a will and -.:e!re asking that it be divided

15

equally among her cr.ilcrcn.

16

THE COURT:

S'ae

Is there any one present

1*1

in Court who has any objection to the First and Final

*8|

Account and Petition for Decree of Final Distribution''

19

1

20)
21

MR. FRANK GENTRY:

Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Will you identify your

name for the record?
MR. FRANK GENTRY:

I T m Frank Gentry, one of

23

the heirs and the son of Ivy Gentry and if I ! m permitted

-*j

the time I'd like to clear up a few things and ask a number

•5

of questions or ask the privilege to have this matter

-6|

postponed until my attorney and my counsel can make an
examination and investigation and submit to you a formal

28
29

report.
THE COURT:

'-^o is your attorney,

* * r*

^

to
to tthat,
h a t . ;Kr.
!r.
i

Mi. GSKTRY:

Mr* ?at Fenton.

THE COURT:

Do you have any objection

Chamberlain?
KR. CHAMBERS:: •I:

No, Your Honor ,

As a

!
i

2!

!

matter of fact what I'd iik-2 t o do i s if there s going

i

to be any objection, as the Court can very c l e a r l y observe
from the f i l e , t h i s i s an iii t e s t a t e probate where we1re
asking thac the property be d i s t r i b u t e d t o the heirs at
law.

The heirs are set forth in.the petition.

1

We have no

objection at all to him cAfcing any inquiry or investigaq

tion he desires ;o make; however, I would prefer to have
10 I
11 ,

-he matter set on the trial calendar.
certain zez

I would like a date

for the trial of the? r,-ttter and I'd like ~o

13-

'-Tour Honor fi:: a day within which they can file a;:y •. .••itten

14|

protests or objections to the Petition and that c!.:ul; be

15j

it least ten dayc prior to the tir.i of the trial, t;...i. I'd

16'

like this matter set on the trial calendar so it can \z

17

dettenr.ir.sd.
18

IKE COURT:

19
2Q

Fenton, Kr. Gentry?

21
22
22

Have you talked to Mr.

KR. GENTRY:
Fenton.

He couldn't ba her*
THE COURT:

Yes, I have ensued Kr.
because of a conflict.
This is what I1 lido:

I111

24

continue the natter for a period of two weeks until the
25

next Law and Motion Day.

I111 give you ten days in order

26
27

to have Kr. Fenton examine this file and make any objec-

28

tion thatt he has.

29
30

KR. GENTRY:

vvhat I'd like the Court

to do is give us a longer tise tnan that so he will have

THE COURT:
MH«

Well —

CHAMEZRLA;LT:

Year Honor, i n order t o

. r e c o m m i t ? Ilr* Gentry >:1>J ic rr.cl.l^ a p e r ^ o n d ap^a.!'6rtce'
1

to object :o the Account, P.opcrt and P e t i t i o n for D i s t r i -

2)

4[

bution, could we have an crder to the effect t h a t written
or
objections, that i s whatever written objection/ protests

5

t h a t they wish t o interpore t o t h i s p e t i t i o n w i l l be

a

f i l e d no l a t e r than two v;ecks from today and that t h i s

3

\

;
j

7

a
9

matter will be held on lev; m i :•:•;• tion calendar next follow- j
ing that date.

THE COURT:

"o you have any o b j e c t i o n

!2J

I'S. GSOTRY:

Z ZL£a*t hear him.

13

THE COURT:

:;-. e t h e r words I<d l i k e

n

14
15

to that?

t o have your w r i t t e n objee:...;. . i l e d on or before tfcs ::2xt
Law and n o t i o n Day which ::. ^ ' ; rcclrs f r e e today and t h a t

16

m a t t e r w i l l be continued ur.cil the following Law and .'lotion
17

Day which w i l l be b a s i c a l l y Tour wce-ks from today, t h a t i s
19

if you file a written objection.

How, frankly, that is

20j

more than fair and so if you1re coins to go talk to Mr.

21 |

Fenton, please understand that is more than fair and he can

22 |

get a copy of this file or the papers in the file for the

23

purpose of making an objection within that period of time.

24 1

So, do you understand what I'm doing now?
25

MR. GENTRY:

Yos.

271

TEE COURT:

Alright.

25

MR# GEWTRY:

Let me ask another ques-

THE COURT:

You may surely.

IS. GEKTRY:

Would there be any sense

26 j

29

3D

tion.

to have the court appoint two Administrators that are in
this faraiiy?
T*fK cmn?T:
1

I?t r.o juat ace

«

^s-

already been an Administrator appointed.

2;
KR. CHAMBERLAIN:

3
4

Administrators who are asking,

sI
si
7

in fact there are two

MR. GENTRY:

Your Honor, I feel that

these two have never conversed with me.

They are biased;

they are prejudiced; and I would like to ask' the Court

S
to issue an appointment of an administrator, one from
Sevisr County here and the other from Beaver

n

This is thirty years of zy work that's involved.
Ts

^

12 i

COURT:

13J

explci.i s o m e t h i n g :

14

adminirtr&tors.

15

County.

M r . G e n t r y , l e t r.e just

I hava h e r e t o f o r e appointed t w o

They havs worked with this estate.

Tnc-y

have ,c:-:pleted every—in- chat is to be done in tie csts.se.

16
They are now asking tha Court to approve what they have
17
finally done and they are raying that the estate 13
18
19 |

^ a d y to be distributed.

20

appoint two new administrators what would be the purpose of

21

that?

22

My point is when you ask me to

KR, GENTRY:

Well, can they be dls-

THE COURT:

Listen to me a minute:

23
qualified?
24
25
25
27|

They are telling me that they have completed everything
and that it is ready to be distributed.

2B
291
30

KR. GENTRY:

But they've never talked

THE COURT:

That I don't know and, of

to me.

course, they aren't obligated to talk to you.

I don't

5
need to t e l l you t h a t .

;/hat I'n* crying i s you have a

right t o see what they have done and you have a right t o
r<t

l* ?" obJ*cticn to vhst thoy'v: ions i f you think t ; ^ T

i;

done something wrong.

2
i

I

3I
4I

You can bri::g i t to ay a t t e n t i o n

and I w i l l then determine t h a t .

Do you see what I mean,

i f there i s something that they've done wrong?

51

MR. GENTRY:

That's f i n e .

J
6!
7
i

a
9!

u
12
13
14
15

raE

COURT:

But I don't want to tell

you that I'm going to appoint semeone else when they tell
ce -hat everything has been done and they are ready to
divide it up among the members of the family.
. .lie:: what I'm saying?

Do you

So, cy advice to you is that you

.i:!'.• to Mr. ?-anton, have him go ever this account, have
ever
..:::-. ;c/everything they've done in this natter, and if r.z
- -13 that they have done something wronr ir if he feels.
uhat t:c:r.ethins is wrong wish this accounting, then he Lz

16

to file what is known as an objection and bring it to cy
17
18
19

attention and I will find cut if there is something wrong
or if there isn't something wrorv; and I don't want to get

2aj

the cart before the horse, if you follow me.

21 !

will do is this:

22

I ' l l continue t h i s matter for the period of one month, then

23

So, what I

This is the Order that I'm going to make:

without further n o t i c e , and I w i l l allow you or the other

24

h e i r s the period of two weeks t o f i l e w r i t t e n objections
25
26

t o t h i s accounting, that i s , tne f i n a l accounting of the
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P e t i t i o n for Final D i s t r i b u t i o n , s e t t i n g forth within that

23

period of two weeks what i s wrong with i t .

29
30

VR. GE2J7RY:

Alright.

THE COURT:

Now, a copy of t h i s written

o b j e c t i o n w i l l he sew^H nnr>n h*~ f-fcmhdTOain who ranre-

scats the Administrators of this estate, so he has notice
of what they're objecting, so he can find out if there'3
something reang in <•>?.*» •-» -*-•-«• r.-t I^PAI *\..•_.»'. :^ „>.j :.:\' i1.^
wrong.

So, he likewise will have an opportunity to talk

j

to his clients. Then four weeks fresi that time this r.atter i
will be back before the Court and I'm instructing ay
Clerk to bring it back before the Court and it will coze
61

before me at that time. Now, zz that time, you will have,

7|

both of you, an opportunity to fee h:,ard.

8

thing wrong and I feel that thera chould be additional

9

If there's some-

time given, I will set up addi"i:v" 1 time where you both
can present your ideas. After 1 L:.:': r/.-sr the objections

n

and any answer to the objeccic: *.

12

••.: :? I determine

13

that in case there's nothing wri:. ... '..-r* I'll make an

141

order that I feel is necessary.

15

|

16

EX. GZlTZKi:

I " I ask one more ques-

THE COURT:

Ysu aay.

MR. G2NTRJT:

T/.is property is In Iron

tion?

17
IS
19

County.

2Q

21

Is it the law that this hearing should be held

over here or over there?

22

THE COURT:

23

I assume she died here.

1

24

KR. CHAK3ERLAIN:

IJo, this will be held here.

The decedent died here and

25

was a resident of Sevier County.
26 J

THE COURT:

271

2s

If the decedent was a

resident of this county at the time of her death, that's

29 j where the proceedings should be held regardless of where
30

!

the land is.

I

_

_ _ _

_

II

a half and two thirds of this is in my father's estate in

2

Iron County so I was Just wondering what held priority.

3

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

The estate of yoir father

4

has been fully administered and a Decree of Distribution •

5

entered in Iron County.

6

THE COURT:

7

Is this your mother, Ivy

Gentry?

8

MR. GENTRY:

9

THE COURT:

Yes.
Well, of course, in a

10

probate of a person's estate, the only estate you are

11

dealing with is that which that person owns.

12

ov/ned one-third or one-tenth or one-thirtieth, that's what

13

we've got to probate.

U

MR. GENTRY:

If she

Well, we maintain, Judge,

15

that my mother was settled with before and she received the

16

house and furnishings and that was all taken care of.

17

Now, there's a lot of things so be brought into light but

13

we will g o into that later.

19

THE COURT:

That's what Mr. penton will

20

have t o bring to my attention.

21

listing this as the property she owned at the time of her

22

death and that is something that Mr. Fenton can bring to

23

my attention in the forming of an objection.

24

MR.GENTRY:

As far as I know they are

This i s very important to

25

u s . This represents thirty years of work out there.

26

is our home and the other heirs chose to come home and I

27

remained out there and now tney want to split it up

28

equally and there are a couple of liens against this

29

estate too.

ifrI

THE COURT-

Ms?. C e n t r a

of c o u r s e .

This

7

don't want to get into that at this tir.2.
MR. GENTRY:

I see.

THE COURT:

Everything that comes

before this Court is very important, so you understand.
MR. GENTRY:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Everything that comes

before this Court is extremely important or it wouldn't
be here, and, of course, what we're trying to do is what
is risht.

I am sure if you talk to your attorney and go

over thi s matter with him he will advise you of what he
thinks is right and if he feels that an objection should be
filed, I am sure he will do so and if Mr. Chamberlain, who
represents these people, wishes to answer and denies what
Mr. r-.:ron files, I will take that into consideration too
ani I -r. the one who will decide in the long run.

Okeh?

MR. GENTRY:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

I will assure you that I

will do what I think is right.
MR. GENTRY:

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT:

It is the Order that this

matter is continued for one month on the second Law and
Motion Day frota this date, that any one of the heirs have
a right to file a written objection with the period cf two
weeks, copy of which should be served on Mr. Chamberlain,
so he can make any answer he desires and I will hear the
matter four weeks from today.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

If you will notify Mr.

penton accordingly that he will not receive any further
notice of this.

MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:

Alright.
The matter is continued and

3I

will go on the calendar four weeks from today.

4

prepare an Order in conformity with what I have stated, Mr.

5

Chamberlain?

61

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I shall, and I shall submit

it to the Court sometime today.
THE COURT:

1
i

Will you

Thank you.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DTSTPICT COURT CF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FCR THE COUNTY OF I PON, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
FRANK DAVID GENTRY,
Defendant.

y

Criminal No. 1232

This natter cane on before the above-entitled Court, the
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, for trial to the bench on
January 25th, 1989.

The Defendant had previously waived his right

to a trial by jury through counsel and repeated that waiver in
open Court at the commencement of the trial.
evidence in t^e

CELSQ

The Court heard the

in full and took a brief recess orior to

bearing closing arguments of counsel.

During that recess, counsel

for the defense and counsel for the prosecution were able to
discuss the case and approached the Court with a proposal for a
plea agreement which would involve dismissal of the charges
against Curtis Gentry, a co-defendant, and dismissal of one of t'^e
charges against Frank David Gentry in exchange for his plea of
guilty to one Third Degree Felony and contained certain other
terms.

Thereafter a chance of plea was taken on the record by
the Court in accordance with the terms agreed to by the partier.
In view of the fact that the case had been fully tried the Court
did not explain the elements of the offense to the Defendant
during the change cf plea nor was there any factual basis
determined for the entry of the plea since the Defendant had been
present throughout the trial and was well aware of the evidence
which had been admitted and the charges against him.
The Court took the Defendant's plea cf guilty to one
Third Degree Felony offense cf Theft, having heard the evidence in
the case and having made its own determination that the evidence
supported a conviction of the Defendant for that offense as well
as the Criminal Trespass offense which was dismissed as part of
the plea agreement.
Thereafter on February 15th, 1989, the Defendant's
counsel Earl S. Spafford withdrew from the Defendant's
representation and on February 24th, 19S9 a notice of appeal was
filed by George T. Waddoups as attorney for the Defendant Frank
David Gentry.

Mr. Waddoups then motioned this Court to allow the

Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on April 6th, 1989.

An

additional request was made to remand the matter to the Circuit
Court for preliminary hearing.

In the original motion to withdraw

the guilty plea the Defendant raised questions of whether or net
:4r. Centry understood the plea agreement and whether he was able
to hear and understand the colloquy between himself and the Court
at the time that he entered his plea.
those assertions in the record.

There is no support for

Thereafter the Defendant's motion

to v/ithdraw the guilty plea was argued to the Court on May 1st,
1989 and Mr. Waddoups raised orally during that argument the issue
of whether or not the elements of the offense should have been
explained to Kr. Gentry during the taking of his plea.
In view7 of the Defendant's assertion of the latter
argument on May 1, 1989, the Court granted the prosecution's
motion for additional time to answer the allegations set forth by
Mr. Waddoups and the matter was continued to June 1st, 1989 at
1:30 p.m. to allow additional time for counsel to submit memoranda.
All parties having submitted their memoranda and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court now enters
the following ruling:
IT IS HEREBY ORDEPED that the Motion to withdraw the
plea of guilty filed by Frank David Gentry is DENIED.

The Court

finds that the Defendant had participated in a day long trial to
the bench and was well aware of the allegations against him and
the factual underpinnings of those allec?tions.

In addition, the

Court was prepared and is new prepared to enter its determination

that the Defendant was in fact proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt at the time of that trial of both the Third Degree Felony
which he entered a plea of guilty and the Class C Misdemeanor of
Criminal Trespass which was dismissed as part of the plea
agreement.

There was never any doubt that Mr. Gentry fully

understood and heard all of the proceedings surrounding his plea
of guilty as his answers and comments clearly demonstrate.

In

view of this Order, the request to remand the matter to the
Circuit Court for an additional preliminary hearing is moot and
therefore DENIED.
DATED this

/—

day of September, 1989.

£2
. i^IILI? EV
itth Distri

Judge

MAILING CEPTIFICATE
I hereby cert:ify that on this /^F day of ^ M t l / ^ k V .
foregoina'was
1989, a true and correctt copy of the above and .toregc
railed, first class postage prepaid, or hand delivered, to:

#c b a -T^^r*&
Iron County Attorney
P. 0. Box 428
Cedar City, UT 84720

George T. Waddoups, Esq.
Twelfth Floor
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Carolyn Smitherman
Administrative Executive

ADDENDUM C

6
MR, ~ GENTRY Yes.

waive the jury?
MR

(
" GENTRY

MR. SPAFPORD:
tjie

¥ es, we are.
And to have Judge Eves try the case as

t r i e r 0|: f ac t?
MR- C GENTRY: Yes.
MR. SPAFFORD:

And you recognize that we've explained

that to you, tha t: 3 m idge Eves would apply the same standard
of evidence and the same assessment of things that
happened as :I I: he were t:Jih e jr iry?
MR.
I1 I I I

GENTRY

!ires .

II A K M I I I'Mil I

Ill III

,

I H I s i ti i d

a I in IIMl

I I Jl'i"

'ves would have the additional ipsponsibi1ify of applying
;

MR

GENTRY

MR

GENTRY: Xes.

MR. SPAFFORD:

!<!! es.

Now, are you, satisfied with us

proceed ing In that fashion?
MR

GENTRY

MR.

No

GENTRY

MR.

„ , „,
v* *xx>

* i have to exclude witnesses
in !

i l : 1 111 i i

I, ii11' is»J :!! ill ::! i l a i

III I i:.

'on

I line r i g h t

that

You will recall tha t that
IIKJ ,

ADDENDUM D

MP

F

GENTRY-

THE nnriRT

! do,

/" ll

,l I

-v Mr Curtis Gentry did

answer vocally, jod I do appreciate that.

5

MR, KIMBAL;

6

ciient,

Excuse ne

prank Gen' •

je s? - « Your Honor. M y

I •' "l li h.i I ul hearing; so, w e

7 1 may need sometimes lo repeat things or tu speak <±s ioi
8

as poss ible
T"»V ','UUT

9 I
10

we'll certainly try to do that.

hear me all right, Mr. Gentry?
ME

F

GENTRY:

T

Yes

woul 1 appreciate

slow and with a little more
JLO i

THE iM'ih1

iJ

MR KIMBALL.

'

THF
Mh

2

i

23
24 I
25

an opening statement?

Honor.

Yo'ir Honor, t h e S r at:e w r i n g s b e f o r e

i, Gentry

them w i t h t h e f f

IIICFI

uo a m •

t o d a y t h e casti « • ^t^Lm

li I i 1

i i ii

briefly, Ynur

,M. q.

> ••!

..ill right ?

i dm ", 'V'nt" Honor.

THE COURT.

»

n In lune

Burns, are you ready to proceed?

BURNS

;

talk

Thank you, iuur Hoi -

i iHi

BURNS
: -

if you'd

I 161

VOJIHJI

l1 || try to do that

THE COURT

2, ,

Can you

0f

n\ ,t

. ., p., »• r n „ „ p '

ni

>u

. e n t r y and

The State has charged each of

A Third-Degrf

HI I

I *in»m

trespass.

The e v i d e n c e ..-~~ <**Aw*r

Luaay

— «• I i In IJ JI
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property.
That he also will not commit any vexatious or
other act in the form of a verbal or written
communication.

And that upon completion of an 18-month

period of probation, during which he does not assert
any claim or trespass upon the property, the Court
would favorably entertain a motion to change the plea
and dismiss the charges against him.
In this regard, Your Honor, and as a
condition of the entry of this plea, we would represent
that we will dismiss the civil action that has been
filed in connection therewith.
Now, may I ask Frank if you understand what I
said?
MR. P. GENTRY:

I have to say I couldn't hear it

all, Earl.
MR. SPAPPORD:

All right.

What I!ve done is

repeated exactly what I told you in the hall.
Did you understand that?
MR. P. GENTRY:
MR. SPAPPORD:
MR. P. GENTRY:

Yes.
Are you agreeable to that?
It's going to take more than 10

days to remove our stuff.
MR. SPAPFORD:

Well, you1re not going to go on the

property at all, and Curtis will work it out with the

JERRY MARSDEN, M.D.
A Professional Corporation
515 South 300 East Suite 207
St. George, Utah 84770
801-628-2891
Mi D V e m b e r

3 D. ] 9 8 9

George T. Waddoups
Watkiss & Campbell
31»" .?. . Main 3t
Rt- : Frar.r.
Deai

u e r! r .•'

Waddoups:

Mr.
Gentry was seen
in my office
on t h e 30th of N o v e m b e r .
H i s t o r i c a l l y , he has had d i m i n i s h e d auditory
acuity since W o r l d
War
II when
he was invo] v e d in approximately two explosions.
Examination showed M r . Gentry
to have occlusion
of his left
external
auditory
canal
from a cerumen
i m p a c t i o n , which w a s
removed, Hi s h e ad and neck
e xami n at i on was t h e n wi t h in norma1
II mi t s .
An Audi ogr am
'ra„s obt a I,ned
::: i i Mr
Gent r y wh i : :h s howed a
significant high frequency neurosensory hearing loss in both ears
with his left ear b e i n g m o r e impaired than his right
His speech
di scriminat i on w a s f a,ir in 'each
?,-i
*
"
'
ib L1 i ty t o
u n d e r s t a n d sp e ec h) «
I would regard Mr „ Gentry as having a significant high frequency
neurosensory hearing loss.
This undoubtedly
was significantly
compounded by the cerumen
impaction which
totally occluded his
left ear, I Isually patients with this type
of hearing
loss will
function adequately in a face to face situation in a closed room,
but when they a r e p r e s e n t e d with b a c k g r o u n d noise
or attempt to
h ave c o nve r s a t i o ns
i n a large room, th e i r unde r s t a nd i n g o £ wh a t
i s be ing

s a i d i s e :x t r e in e 1 y

I f I c a n p r ov i d e
contact m e

f ui t h e i

i mp a i r ed ,

:i n f o r m a t i o n

H!

Gentry, please

Sincerely,

)&«.[ li'jamlitf: f//0,
)

Jerry Marsden, M.D,

Dipiomateof American
Academy of Otolaryngology Head and Neck Surgery

Fellow of American
College of Surgeons

Fellow of American
Academy of Facial
Plastic and

ADDENDUM E

propertv ir a" pute Is to b e ] eft o n the ranch, and,
you" .

* *• r *

settle that In a civil court.
R'"I ':;»

MR1, SPAFFORD,

rav.
-

• or)v ,

d -am J ss i

And we would

contemplate

.
MI »i 11 id y o u u n d e r s t a n d that q u e s t i o n and my

a n s w ' i p in

II ?

!

MR. C. GENTRY:

^oncerninc

•* s o u n d e d

,Ike

;t

was i m
I' in e rri ni mi inI ji l I if11
you're
tliaL

going

WOU i(j

to

figr;*

.^ r

•* p i c t u r e

frame

and

g0 to a

right"*
THE COURT:
enm

If you b o t h g e t up Hie tip

rim

^ p r o p e r t y b e l o n g s t o yon, and they «' l a i n

•>f - -<*. ^ ^ t h Line ranc li
1

ever

leave I t

there,

v o u r Ounipla m t in smai 1 i l a i m s c o u r t
and you let
'IN

COURT:
e- -

then yon

a judge l i t i g a t e

and

or

that.

Ill

A l l right

WHi.il #:j 1 se

y

Have we covered

?
MR. SPAPFORD:

" ' 1 1nk we've covered everything,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

It's a complicated plea agreement, bu'"I

" "ifc* ^ « circumstances In tni

t •, i l

an a p p r o p r i a t e resolution, of the issues.

il o
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1

other claim.

2

MR. BURNS:

Okay.

3

THE COURT:

But in your dismissal of the civil case

4 I

We can put that in.

that's been filed, it seems like you can cover that.

5

MR. BURNS:

We'll take care of that, yes.

6 I

THE COURT:

All right.

7

MR. BURNS:

Nothing from the State.

8

MR. SPAFFORD:

9

MR. BURNS:

10
11

Anything else?

I think thatfs it.

The State agrees upon the defendant's

plea to a third-degree felony theft,
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Frank Gentry, will you

12

come forward and stand up here by your attorney,

13

please.

14

stand right here close where I can talk to you, Frank.

15

I want you to be in a position where you can hear me.

Just stand right there.

This is fine.

Just

16

Mr. Gentry, as you know, you're entitled to a

17

trial in this matter, and we have been engaged today in

18

that trial.

19 1

Do you understand that?

20

MR. F. GENTRY:

21

THE COURT:

Yes.

And you're entitled to have the State

22

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the

23

charges that are before this court.

24
25

Do you understand that?
MR. F. GENTRY:

Yes, sir.

